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We propose a simple incomplete-markets small open economy model which is amenable to
analytical dissection of its policy-relevant mechanisms. In contrast to its complete-markets
limit, the equilibrium real exchange rate is irreducible from the incomplete-markets equilib-
rium. Market incompleteness exacerbates the domestic-inflation and output-gap monetary-
policy trade-off in two ways: its steepness and its resulting endogenous cost-push to the
trade-off. The latter depends on an equilibrium combination of structural shocks and on
agents’ beliefs of future events. Thus, in comparison to its complete-markets and closed-
economy limits, standard Taylor-type rules are less capable of inducing determinate ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium in our environment. Despite the larger policy trade-off under
incomplete markets, simple policies that also respond to exchange-rate growth are able to
manage expectations that drive the endogenous cost-push term. However, policies that di-
rectly respond to expectations may turn out to exacerbate the cost-push trade-off further;
and thus, more likely to fuel self-fulfilling multiple or unstable equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Why should small open economy monetary authorities care about international exchange rates?
Is there a justification for managing exchange rates, and if possible, its expectations thereof?
What is its connection to incomplete international risk sharing of country-specific shocks? In
practice, in many small open economies with floating exchange rate regimes, the dynamics
of the exchange rate matter, in structural modelling, and for monetary policy design. Also, it
remains unclear in the literature, which monetary policy is better equipped for inducing equi-
librium stability, when the dynamics of the exchange rate cannot be decoupled from inflation
and output gap in an equilibrium characterization.
In standard monetary-policy small open economy models, the exchange rate is a reducible
variable in equilibrium. In other words, its explicit dynamics can be decoupled from neces-
sary equilibrium conditions. Specifically, under certain restrictions on inter- and intra-temporal
elasticities of substitution, the open economy dimension merely alters the equilibrium condi-
tions that are familiar to a closed economy model in terms of the slopes of an IS curve and a
Phillips curve [see Benigno and Benigno, 2003; Galı´ and Monacelli, 2005; Clarida et al., 2001].
More generally, if these parametric restrictions are relaxed, Benigno and Benigno [2003] have
shown that the monetary policy implication for the open economy is no longer isomorphic to
its closed-economy limit. That is, the design of monetary policy for the small open economy
must also take into account the trade-offs arising from the open economy channels. However,
the explicit dynamics of the exchange rate is still redundant in these systems as long as the
open economy has access to a complete international state-contingent asset market.
Our considerations in this paper are different to the well known question regarding the “iso-
morphism” between closed- and open-economy monetary policies in the context of New Key-
nesian models. Ours are predicated on the role of international asset market incompleteness
in explaining the irreducibility of the exchange rate from an equilibrium description of a small
open economy. More importantly, we ask how this single feature of market incompleteness
alters well-known monetary policy trade-offs arising in complete-markets small open econ-
omy and closed economy counterparts.1 This then leads us to also ask how the feature matters
for simple and operational monetary policy design, when one is concerned about equilibrium
determinacy.
We propose a tractable small open economy model with incomplete international asset mar-
kets in order to address these two questions. Our model nests the canonical complete-markets
1As a corollary, we will also find that with incomplete markets, as in the more general settings with complete
markets [see e.g. Benigno and Benigno, 2003; Monacelli, 2005; de Paoli, 2009b], there is a break in the monetary
policy isomorphism between the small open economy and its closed economy limit.
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small open economy model of Clarida et al. [2001], which is similar to Galı´ and Monacelli
[2005], and the standard New Keynesian closed economy model [see e.g. Woodford, 2003] as
special cases. Our contribution is twofold.
Our first contribution is the following observation. Incomplete markets result in an irre-
ducible and explicit exchange rate channel, in the model’s equilibrium characterization. This
result manifests itself in terms of two aspects relevant to monetary policy. We show that the
complete-markets open economy has a less onerous domestic-inflation-to-output-gap trade-off
than its closed economy counterpart. (This repeats the insights from Clarida et al. [2001] and
Llosa and Tuesta [2008].) However, for all empirically plausible values of risk aversion, we
also show that the incomplete-markets open economy has a steeper (conditional) trade-off rel-
ative to the same closed-economy counterpart. These new insights are obtained analytically.
Second, the irreducible exchange rate channel also shows up as an endogenous cost-push term
that perturbs the conditional domestic-inflation-output-gap trade-off. This cost-push term is
comprised of conditional expectations of future output gap and exchange rate, along with an
equilibrium combination of primitive exogenous shocks.2 As a corollary, we also obtain a break
in the “monetary-policy isomorphism” between the small open economy and its closed econ-
omy limit.
As our second contribution, we show that established lessons on local stability of rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) under alternative monetary policies are reversed as a result of
the fact that the economy cannot completely insure country-specific risks. The latter poses
additional restrictions on the admissibility of policy rules in inducing determinate REE. We
show that while the inability of a small open economy to insure its country-specific technology
risk reduces such admissible sets of monetary policies, it can be improved by a family of simple
policies that take into account exchange rate growth as well.
The intuition for these numerical findings are given by our first observation above—that the
additional constraints on policy in the incomplete-markets setting arise through: (i) an exacer-
bated conditional trade-off between domestic inflation and output gap; and (ii) the endogenous
cost-push channel. In the incomplete-markets setting, the latter yields another means for mon-
etary policy to prevent self-fulfilling multiple equilibria, or worse, equilibrium instability. This
other means is effected through monetary policies that can “correctly” manage expectations en-
tering the endogenous cost-push term. By smoothing out output gap and real exchange rates,
2We also consider a more general version of the model presented here. The general model admits another
source through which the exchange rate may explicitly matter: The possibility of an imported input in the small
economy’s production structure. The model in this paper is a limit of the general model, and thus in the absence of
this additional channel, an irreducible exchange rate dynamic still remains. In short, this result is purely due to the
existence of incomplete international asset markets.
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and therefore instilling non-self-fulfilling or non-explosive conditional expectations, policies
responding to growth in the exchange rate are better at inducing a determinate rational expec-
tations equilibrium.
We thus provide a simple theoretical rationale for standard monetary policy modelling and
practice in small open economies with floating exchange rates. In practice, modellers and poli-
cymakers in these economies take into account explicit exchange rate dynamics, in model equi-
librium conditions, and, also in policy objectives. For example, clause 4(b) of New Zealand’s
2002 Policy Targets Agreement states that:3
“[I]n pursuing its price stability objective, the Bank shall seek to avoid unnecessary
instability in output, interest rates and the exchange rate”.
Our analysis in this paper also complements existing studies of business cycles and/or wel-
fare consequences of alternative monetary policies assuming incomplete-market large or small
open economies [e.g. McCallum and Nelson, 1999; Chari et al., 2002; Benigno and Thoenissen,
2008; Leitemo and So¨derstro¨m, 2008; de Paoli, 2009b]. While these papers focus on business-
cycle accounting and/or quantifying welfare under alternative policies, there has not been a
clear dissection of how a notion of market incompleteness impacts on equilibrium monetary-
policy trade-offs. Moreover, a clear exposition of the role of international asset market incom-
pleteness in affecting REE determinacy or indeterminacy under alternative monetary-policy
rules has not been studied in either the two-country or small open economy environments.4
Therefore, our contribution is to fill a gap in the literature by providing a tractable ver-
sion of a small-open economy model, whose equilibrium characterization allows for a careful
dissection of the role of incomplete markets in altering existing monetary policy trade-off and
delivering an endogenous cost-push to that trade-off. That is, we can provide analytical and
comparative policy insights with respect to well-known closed- and complete-markets open-
economy models. This then allows us to revisit and contrast with well-known results [e.g.
Bullard and Mitra, 2002; Llosa and Tuesta, 2008] in terms of indeterminacy of REE under stan-
dard simple monetary policy rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the details of our
alternative model. Then we characterize competitive equilibrium in Section 3. In Section 4,
3The Reserve Bank of New Zealand pioneered inflation targeting, implementing this policy in 1990.
4An exception is Linnemann and Schabert [2004] who considered an incomplete markets small open economy
with an additional predetermined state variable in the form of a net foreign asset level (i.e. current account). They
showed how a simple monetary policy rule that reacts to the backward-looking state variable can help to instill a
determinate REE. However, it is not precisely clear how market incompleteness in their model works with respect to
monetary policy trade-offs. In contrast, we present an alternative incomplete markets model that can be analytically
dissected in terms of its mechanism and its implication for monetary-policy trade-offs. Moreover, our approach
allows us to also contrast with well-known complete-markets and closed-economy structures in the literature in an
analytical and comparable way.
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we provide an analytical dissection of how asset market incompleteness in our model can re-
sult in an exacerbated and endogenous monetary policy trade-off. In Section 5, we analyze the
implications of market incompleteness—and therefore the additional restrictions on stability-
inducing monetary policy rules—on equilibrium determinacy. Finally in Section 6, we con-
clude.
2 Model
Consider a small open-economy model consisting of monopolistically competitive domestic
goods markets with nominal pricing rigidity, and, households that only have access to a re-
stricted set of internationally traded non-state-contingent assets – viz. the incomplete interna-
tional asset markets assumption. The domestic economy is small in the sense that local equilib-
rium outcomes do not have any impact on the rest of the world, but, the converse is not true.
The foreign economy (or the rest of the world) is treated as a large closed economy. We will use
variables with an asterisked superscript (e.g. X∗) to refer to the foreign country and variables
without an asterisk to denote the small domestic economy. Subscripts “H” (for Home) and
“F” (for Foreign) on certain variables will denote the country of origin for quantities and their
supporting prices.
2.1 Representative household
As in McCallum and Nelson [1999] or Benigno and Thoenissen [2008], individuals in our small
open-economy have access only to a pair of domestic and foreign nominal uncontingent bonds
denominated in their own currencies, respectively, Bt and B∗t . More precisely, let ht := (z0, ..., zt)
denote the t-history of aggregate shocks, where zt = (At, Y∗t ) is a vector of domestic produc-
tivity and foreign output levels, respectively. Bt+1
(
ht
)
or B∗t+1
(
ht
)
denotes a claim on one unit
of currency following ht, and is independent of any continuation state zt+1 that may occur at
t + 1. Let St
(
ht
)
denote the nominal exchange rate, defined as the domestic currency price of
a unit of foreign currency. In domestic currency terms, the prices of one unit of the nominal
bonds Bt+1
(
ht
)
and B∗t+1
(
ht
)
are, respectively, 1/[1 + rt
(
ht
)
] and St
(
ht
)
/[1 + r∗t
(
ht
)
], where
rt and r∗t are the respective domestic and the foreign nominal interest rates.
The representative consumer in the domestic country faces the following sequential budget
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constraint, for each t ∈N, and each (measurable) history ht,
Pt
(
ht
)
Ct
(
ht
)
+
Bt+1
(
ht
)
1+ rt (ht)
+
St
(
ht
)
B∗t+1
(
ht
)
1+ r∗t (ht)
≤Wt
(
ht
)
Nt
(
ht
)
+ Bt(ht−1) + St
(
ht
)
B∗t (ht−1) +Πt
(
ht
)
, (2.1)
where Pt is the domestic consumer price indexes, Ct is a composite consumption index, Wt is
the nominal wage rate, Nt denotes the hours of labor supplied, and, Πt is the total nominal
dividends received by the consumer from holding equal shares of the domestic firms.
A minor difference of our model to Galı´ and Monacelli [2005] is that consumers exhibit an
endogenous discount factor that we denote by ρt. This assumption is introduced in order to
ensure a unique nonstochastic steady-state consumption level, following Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe [2003].5 However, this is not a fundamental assumption for our conclusions with respect
to the endogenous monetary-policy trade-off arising from the real-exchange-rate channel.6 The
consumers’ preferences are given by the following present-value total expected utility function:
E0
{
∞
∑
t=0
ρt
{
U
[
Ct
(
ht
)]−V [Nt (ht)]}} , ρt =

β
(
Cat−1(h
t−1)
)
ρt−1 for t > 0
1 for t = 0
, (2.2)
whereE0 denotes the expectations operator conditional on time-0 information, and, Cat denotes
the cross-economy average level of consumption.
For concreteness, we will consider the following parametric form for the function β : R+ →
(0, 1), following Ferrero et al. [2010]:
β(Cat ) =
β¯
1+ φ (ln Cat − ϑ)
; β¯ ∈ (0, 1). (2.3)
5See also Lubik [2007] who expand on the results of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe [2003] in terms of a real-business-
cycle model with debt-dependent interest rate on net foreign asset positions. In contrast, Galı´ and Monacelli [2005]
assume the existence of an international market for complete state-contingent claims. In doing so, they thus avoid
the problem of steady-state allocations being dependent on initial conditions. McCallum and Nelson [1999] assume
incomplete markets which would mean the opposite for steady state consumption; but this issue is not discussed
by the authors. In a continuous time setting, Linnemann and Schabert [2004] also an alternative “closure” to this
problem, similar to Lubik [2007], but in a sticky-price model. However, such an alternative introduces an additional
predetermined state variable, and if applied to our setting, would hinder a clean dissection and comparison of the
role of incomplete markets via-a`-vis well-known complete-markets and closed-economy characterizations.
6Other ways of closing open-economy models are also discussed in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe [2003]. In our
framework the most natural alternative could be to assume endogenous transaction cost in taking position in foreign
bonds (see, e.g., Benigno and Thoenissen [2008]). The model with this alternative assumption would be analytically
less tractable, and the equilibrium dynamics requires a specific law of motion for bonds. Our assumption will
make clear that what is crucial for the policy trade-off is just the incompleteness of financial markets, and not the
random walk property of the asset/consumption dynamics implied by this incompleteness (in the absence of the
endogenous discounting assumption).
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We do not impose a priori any condition on the sign of the dependence of the discount factor
on average consumption, i.e., we only assume that β′(Cat ) 6= 0. We also assume that per-period
utility of consumption and labor have the respective forms: U
[
Ct
(
ht
)]
= Ct
(
ht
)1−σ /(1− σ),
and, V
[
Nt
(
ht
)]
= ψNt
(
ht
)1+ϕ /(1+ ϕ), where σ > 0, ϕ > 0, and ψ > 0.
The household chooses an optimal plan {Ct(ht), Nt(ht), Bt+1(ht), B∗t+1(ht)}t∈N to maximize
(2.2) subject to (2.1). Unilaterally, the household will take the aggregate outcome Cat
(
ht
)
, nom-
inal prices {Wt
(
ht
)
, Pt
(
ht
)
, St
(
ht
)}t∈N and policy {rt (ht)}t∈N as fixed for each measurable
ht, and also the household takes B0(h0) and B∗0(h0) as given. To simplify notation hereinafter,
we denote a measurable selection Xt
(
ht
)
=: Xt implicitly. Define the real exchange rate as
Qt := StP∗t /Pt. Given the functional forms, the respective first order conditions of the house-
hold’s problem, for each ht and t ∈N, are:
ψNϕt C
σ
t =
Wt
Pt
, (2.4)
C−σt = (1+ rt)Et
{
β (Cat )
(
Pt
Pt+1
)
C−σt+1
}
, (2.5)
C−σt = (1+ r
∗
t )Et
{
β (Cat )
(
P∗t Qt+1
P∗t+1Qt
)
C−σt+1
}
. (2.6)
Each optimally chosen Ct will be consistent with the household’s intra-period choice of a
home-produced final consumption good, CH,t and an imported final good CF,t, where Ct is
defined by a CES aggregator
Ct =
[
(1− γ) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η + γ
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
; γ ∈ (0, 1), η > 1. (2.7)
Furthermore, each type of final good, CH,t and CF,t, are aggregates of a variety of differentiated
goods indexed by i, j ∈ [0, 1]. Respectively, these aggregates are CH,t =
[∫ 1
0 CH,t (i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
,
and CF,t =
[∫ 1
0 CF,t (j)
ε−1
ε dj
] ε
ε−1
, where ε > 1. As is well known from Galı´ and Monacelli
[2005], optimal allocation of the household expenditure across each good type gives rise to
static demand functions for (CH(i), CF(i), CH, CF) and price indexes. Details of these demand
functions and prices are given in our online Supplementary Appendix (see section A).
2.2 Differentiated goods technology and pricing
We assume a production sector similar to Galı´ and Monacelli [2005]. This is purely to keep
our expositions later transparent and comparable to the mainstream models in the literature
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[i.e. Galı´ and Monacelli, 2005; Clarida et al., 2001; Llosa and Tuesta, 2008].7 Each domestic firm
i ∈ [0, 1] produces a differentiated good. Production is represented by a linear technology
Yt
(
i, ht
)
= AtNdt
(
i, ht
)
, (2.8)
where Ndt (i, h
t) is labor hired by the firm; and the random variable At := exp{at} is an exoge-
nous embodied labor productivity. With a homogeneous of degree one production function
the first-order conditions (for cost minimization with respect to labor) can be written in the
aggregate as
Wt
(
ht
)
Pt (ht)
=
MCnt
(
ht
)
Pt (ht)
At. (2.9)
where MCnt is nominal marginal cost.
Since each firm i ∈ [0, 1] is assumed to be imperfectly competitive, it gets to set an optimal
price PH,t(i, ht) given a Calvo-style random time-independent signal to do so. With a per-
period probability (1− θ) the firm gets to reset price. For every date t and history ht, the firm’s
optimal pricing decision is characterized by a first-order condition:
Et
{
∞
∑
k=0
θk
(
t+k−1
∏
τ=t
β(Caτ)
)
ξt+k
ξt
Yt+k(i)
[
P˜H,t(i)−
(
ε
ε− 1
)
MCnt+k
]}
= 0, (2.10)
where ξt := UC(Ct), and the demand faced by the firm at some time t + k (and following
history ht+k), conditional on the firm maintaining a sale price of P˜H,t(i) is
Yt+k(i) =
(
P˜H,t(i)
PH,t+k
)−ε [
CH,t+k + C∗H,t+k
]
. (2.11)
In a symmetric pricing equilibrium, where P˜H,t := P˜H,t(ht) = P˜H,t(i, ht), the law of motion
for the aggregate price is PH,t =
[
θP1−εH,t−1 + (1− θ)P˜1−εH,t
] 1
1−ε
. As this part of the model is quite
standard in the literature, we derive the details separately (see Supplementary Appendix B).
2.3 Market clearing
In a competitive equilibrium we require that given monetary policy and exogenous processes,
the decisions of households and firms are optimal, as characterized earlier, and that markets
clear. First, the labor market must clear, so that (2.4) equals (2.9) for all states and dates:
7In the online Supplementary Appendix to this paper we consider a more general production model, which
admits domestic labor and imported intermediate factors of productions as in McCallum and Nelson [1999]. Qual-
itatively, this will not matter for the implications of incomplete asset markets for our monetary policy trade-off. In
fact, the extension generalizes our main points and conclusions in this paper.
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Nt(i, ht) = Ndt (i, h
t). Second, the final Home-produced goods market for each variety i ∈ [0, 1]
clears so that:
Yt(i, ht) = CH,t(i, ht) + C∗H,t(i, h
t). (2.12)
Third, the no-arbitrage condition for international bonds will be given by the equality of (2.5)
and (2.6). In the rest of the world, assumed to be the limiting case of a closed economy, we have
market clearing as Y∗t = C∗t .
3 Local equilibrium dynamics
In this section we characterize the log-linearized rational expectation equilibrium (REE) dy-
namics of our small open-economy. To this end, consider the gap between each aggregate
variable and its respective potential level defined in an equilibrium with fully flexible domestic
prices – i.e. when the percentage deviation (from steady state) of real marginal cost, denoted by
mct, is zero at any time t and in any state. Let lowercase variables denote the percentage devia-
tion of its level X from its nonstochastic steady state point Xss, e.g. x := ln(X/Xss). Define the
potential output and the real exchange rate, respectively, yt and qt, as the levels of output and
real exchange rate, respectively, at the flexible-price equilibrium. It can be shown that the levels
of both yt and qt only depend on exogenous variables. Let x˜t and q˜t denote the domestic output
gap and the real exchange rate gap (in percentage deviation), respectively, where x˜t = yt − yt
and q˜t = qt − qt. The REE characterization can be approximated to first-order accuracy as a
system of forward-looking stochastic dynamic equations for x˜t, piH,t and q˜t. (Derivations are
provided in Supplementary Appendix C.)
Definition 1 (Incomplete Markets (IM)) Given a monetary policy process {rt}t∈N and exogenous
processes {et, ut}t∈N, a (locally approximate) rational expectations competitive equilibrium (REE) in
the IM model is a bounded stochastic process {piH,t, x˜t, q˜t}t∈N satisfying:
piH,t = β¯Et {piH,t+1}+ λ (κ1 x˜t + κ2q˜t) , (3.1)
x˜t = vEt {x˜t+1} − µ [rt −Et {piH,t+1}] + χEt {q˜t+1}+ et, (3.2)
q˜t = Et {q˜t+1} − (1− γ) [rt −Et {piH,t+1}] + ut. (3.3)
where β = β(Css),
λ =
(1− θ) (1− θβ¯)
θ
,
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κ1 = ϕ+
σ
1− γ , κ2 = −
σηγ(2− γ)
(1− γ)2 +
γ
(1− γ) ;
v =
σ
σ− φ , µ =
[
1− γ
σ− φ
] [
1− γ+ ηγ (2− γ) (σ− φ)
1− γ
]
, and, χ =
ηγφ (2− γ)
(1− γ) (σ− φ) .
Consider the equilibrium IS functional equation (3.2). In our small open economy the real
exchange rate indirectly affects the output gap via the ex-ante real interest rate (through µ). This
indirect channel is similar to the standard models of Galı´ and Monacelli [2005] and Clarida
et al. [2001], and, depends on the degree of openness γ. Note however, movements in the
conditional expectation of the real exchange rate in our model also affect the output gap (via χ)
directly: (i) by modifying the marginal rate of substitution of consumption between different
periods and across states (i.e. φ); and (ii) the interaction of these effects with the substitution
between home and foreign-produced good (via η). This direct channel is just an artefact of the
endogenous discount rate model, and, is negligible when we assume the limiting case for the
elasticity of the discount rate with respect to aggregate consumption, φ↘ 0. In this case, χ ≈ 0.
This assumption follows Ferrero et al. [2010]. Furthermore, φ, affects the elasticities of output
gap with respect to the ex-ante real interest rate µ. Again, with φ ↘ 0, this indirect channel
introduced by endogenous discounting will be negligible.
Equation (3.1) is an augmented New Keynesian Phillips curve representing the dynamics of
the short-run aggregate supply. Consider first, the term λκ1 representing the direct equilibrium
link between output gap and domestic inflation. This term has the textbook interpretation of
a conditional slope of the Phillips curve in output-gap-domestic-inflation space. It indexes
the domestic-inflation-output-gap (or monetary policy) trade-off. This trade-off connects the
domestic labor market equilibrium relation (hence the dependency of κ1 on ϕ and σ) and goods
market clearing (hence γ) to firm’s wage bill (or real marginal cost) and their optimal pricing
plans. For example, when output demand gap x˜t goes up, all else unchanged, there is a rise
in the domestic firms’ demand for labor input to meet the rise in demand for their final goods.
This raises the firms’ real marginal cost and therefore domestic inflation, as some firms can
and optimally would like to readjust prices upward to maintain their optimal markup plan.
Variation in x˜t also has effects on the real exchange rate. Hence the degree of openness γ
further steepens this domestic-inflation-output-gap trade-off. This feature is also common to
standard complete markets models [e.g. Clarida et al., 1999, 2001].
Next, consider the term involving κ2 which is only present in the IM economy. This direct
link between real exchange rate movements and the real marginal cost encapsulates two effects
arising from demand channels corresponding to the two terms in the composite parameter κ2
in equation (3.1). Consider an increase in the (current) real exchange rate—i.e. an exchange
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rate depreciation. This increases the relative prices of the imported consumption goods faced
by domestic consumers. This effect has a substitution and a wealth effect on real marginal cost,
and thus on domestic inflation in the equilibrium Philips curve (3.1). On the one hand (i.e. the
first term in κ2), this leads consumers to reduce the demand for imported goods, and therefore
to reduce aggregate consumption and to substitute it for more leisure. This translates into an
increase in marginal product of labor that drives the marginal cost up. On the other hand
(i.e. the second term in κ2), this relative increase in the price of imported consumption goods
reduces the real wage income faced by consumers, who would react by increasing labor supply
in response to a lower purchasing power of their given income. This leads to a reduction in the
marginal product of labor, which pushes the marginal cost down.
Observe that the substitution effect dominates if agents are sufficiently risk averse—i.e. σ >
(1− γ)/[η(2− γ)]) so that κ2 < 0. This implies that the effect of an increase in the relative price
of the imported consumption goods on marginal cost is always negative. Therefore, the overall
impact of the real exchange rate on domestic inflation will also be negative.8 Moreover, the
larger is the measure of agents’ risk aversion σ, the more sensitive is the previously discussed
domestic-inflation-output-gap (or monetary-policy) trade-off, which is indexed by κ1, to the
real exchange rate. That is, we can imagine the monetary-policy trade-off shifting around more,
the more sensitive it is to real exchange rate movements—i.e. larger κ2. In Section 4, we will
relate to these observations again when we study the role of market-incompleteness in affecting
the policy trade-off.
Therefore, in contrast to standard models in the literature, we do not need to assume exoge-
nous ”cost-push shocks” in order to create a non-trivial monetary policy trade-off.9 Moreover,
in contrast to standard open-economy models, [e.g. Benigno and Benigno, 2003; Galı´ and Mona-
celli, 2005; de Paoli, 2009a], the relevant monetary-policy trade-off embedded in the Phillips
curve—between x˜t and piH,t—is now perturbed by an endogenous “cost-push” channel (via
λκ2).10
8When we generalize the production side to include imported intermendiate inputs, the sign of κ2 is then
ambiguous, and it depends on the degree of openness γ and the share of imported intermediate inputs (1− α). For
empirically plausible parametrization, we show that in such a more general model, the overall sign of this slope is
still negative.
9See Clarida et al. [1999, 2001] for a detailed discussion on this ad-hoc cost-push term.
10In our model the real marginal cost is not fully tied to the output gap but also depends on the real exchange
rate as is shown in Section C of the supplementary appendix. Moreover, as (3.3) shows, the dynamics of the real ex-
change rate depends on the exogenous variable ut given some endogenous nominal interest rate rt policy outcome.
This feature of our model does not rely on price stickiness in an additional imported goods sector as in Monacelli
[2005].
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4 Dissecting the IM mechanism
We will now study the role of international asset-market incompleteness in this model in two
parts. In Section 4.1, we demonstrate how IM implies an irreducible (i.e. explicit) real exchange
rate channel. This is done by contrast to its two limit-economy observations—a complete-
markets (CM) model and a closed (CD) economy model. In Section 4.2, we complete the study
by looking at what these limit economies mean for comparative monetary policy trade-offs
across the three models. The following exposition on IM’s exchange-rate irreducibility and
IM’s limit CM and CD economies will allow us to form sharper insights into how market
incompleteness alters monetary-policy trade-offs relative to the well-known CM and CD as-
sumptions. These insights will be useful for understanding the results of our experiments on
alternative monetary policies and equilibrium determinacy later.
4.1 Two limit economies of IM
The IM model nests familiar complete-markets [e.g. Clarida et al., 2001] and closed-economy
[e.g. Woodford, 2003] counterparts. Let κ1 and κ2 be as stated in Definition 1.
In the complete markets (CM) version of our model, complete international risk sharing
results in a tight link between the real exchange rate and the marginal rate of substitution
between cross-country consumption, qt = σ (ct − c∗t ), in every date and state of the nature.11
Using this relationship and from market clearing, we obtain that
yt =
(1− γ)2 + σηγ(2− γ)
σ(1− γ) qt + y
∗
t . (4.1)
Equation (4.1) also holds when output and the real exchange rate are at their respective poten-
tials, yt and qt. Since y
∗
t is exogenous and assuming it is at its potential level, this implies that
output gap is proportional to the real exchange rate gap, or
q˜t =
σ(1− γ)
(1− γ)2 + σηγ(2− γ) x˜t ≡ τx˜t. (4.2)
Using this fact we arrive at the following characterization of a REE for the CM economy:
Proposition 1 (Complete Markets (CM)) If the small open economy has access to complete interna-
tional Arrow securities, then the real exchange rate is reducible from—i.e. it has no direct role in—the
11With complete markets, the Euler condition (within the conditional expectations operator) in (2.5) will in fact
hold for every state of nature, following every history, such that equating the Home Euler condition to that of the
rest of the world, one can derive the condition that Qt = (C∗t /Ct)−σ, and a log-linear transform of this expression
is qt = σ (ct − c∗t ).
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dynamic characterization of equilibrium. The competitive equilibrium is then described by
piH,t = βEt {piH,t+1}+ λκCM x˜t (4.3)
x˜t = vEt {x˜t+1} − µCM [rt −Et {piH,t+1}] + et, (4.4)
where
κCM =
σ
(1− γ)2 + σηγ(2− γ) + ϕ ≡ κ1 + τκ2, τ :=
σ(1− γ)
(1− γ)2 + σηγ(2− γ) ,
µCM =
[
1− γ
σ− φ (1− γ)
] [
1− γ+ ηγσ (2− γ)
1− γ
]
.
(4.5)
The first term on the right of κCM ≡ κ1 + τκ2 in (4.5) captures the direct link between output
gap on domestic inflation. This channel is common with its counterpart in the IM model which
was explained earlier. In contrast to IM, the second term in κCM captures a compound effect.
Recall that in the IM economy, since real exchange rate variation q˜t is explicitly decoupled from
output gap x˜t (due to incomplete international risk sharing), then exogenous shocks causing
movements in q˜t would directly impact on domestic inflation via the equilibrium trade-off term
κ2. However, as we showed in (4.2), under CM, complete international risk sharing means
that movements in q˜t is directly absorbed in x˜t, reflecting equilibrium shifts of state-contingent
allocations that satisfy the state-by-state and date-by-date no-arbitrage asset pricing restriction.
Therefore any impact of movements in q˜t on domestic inflation—i.e. κ2 in the equivalence in
(4.5)—will only arise indirectly via domestic output gap adjustments in the CM economy—i.e.
the compound term τκ2.
Observe that these indirect effects of the real exchange rate in the dynamic of the domestic
inflation (3.1) through marginal cost disappear when γ = 0. Furthermore, if φ = 0, then there
is no direct real exchange rate channel in the IS relation (3.2) as well. Moreover, Clarida et al.
[2001] have shown that such an economy is qualitatively similar to the CM economy. That is:
Proposition 2 (Closed Economy (CD)) If the economy (i) does not rely on imported final consump-
tion goods, γ = 0, and (ii) thus endogenous discounting is an irrelevant assumption (i.e. φ = 0), then
the model is equivalent to the canonical new-Keynesian closed-economy model.
piH,t = βEt {piH,t+1}+ λκCD x˜t (4.6)
x˜t = vEt {x˜t+1} − µCD [rt −Et {piH,t+1}] + et, (4.7)
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where
κCD = ϕ+ σ, µCD =
1
σ
, ω = 1. (4.8)
This limit economy is isomorphic to the complete-markets small open economy characterized by (4.3) and
(4.4).
Finally, note that our model admits another source through which the exchange rate may
explicitly matter: the endogenous discount factor channel. However, as discussed earlier, this
remains inconsequential to this result (i.e. when φ↘ 0). That is, if the endogenous discounting
were not present, an irreducible exchange rate dynamic still remains; and the latter is purely a
result from the existence of incomplete international asset markets.
4.2 Limit economies and comparative policy trade-offs
We are now ready to discuss comparative monetary-policy trade-offs between IM and its limit
economies: CM and CD. These comparisons can be conveniently cast in terms of the constant-
relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) parameter σ. That is, under specific values of σ we would have,
respectively, an equivalence between IM and CM and an equivalence between IM and CD
in terms of REE and monetary-policy trade-offs. For values of σ away from these demarcat-
ing equivalence points, we can compare monetary-policy trade-offs implied by these three
economies’ different REE.12 We will also discuss which of all the cases of REE policy trade-
offs considered are relevant for quantitatively plausible values of σ.
In the following observations, we maintain the assumption of φ ↘ 0, which was justified
earlier. First, consider the case when IM has the same REE characterization as CM. From Def-
inition 1 and Proposition 1, we can see that this occurs when κ2 = 0. A sufficient condition,
written in terms of the risk aversion parameter σ is σ = σ∗ := 1−γ
η(2−γ) . Denote this REE equiv-
alence as CM(σ∗) ≡ CD(σ∗). Perturbing the IM(σ) economy away from this special case,
we have that ∂κ2/∂σ = ηγ(2− γ)/(1− γ)2 > 0 —i.e. this implies that in the IM economies
with high risk aversion at some σ 6= σ∗ (i.e. with consumer that are more sensitivity to inter-
and intra-temporal realloaction of risky consumption), the trade-off between output gap and
domestic inflation (as indexed by κ1) will face larger “shifts” due to movements in the real
exchange rate. (Also, recall the earlier observation on this point in section 3.)
Second, consider the case when CM is equivalent to CD, or κCM = κCD. Comparing Propo-
sition 1 and Proposition 2, a sufficient condition for this economy to arise is when σ = σˆ := 1/η.
12It is important to keep in mind that we are always comparing like with like—i.e. identical model parameters
(for each instance of a common value for σ) across economies.
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Denote this REE equivalence as CM(σˆ) ≡ CD(σˆ). Away from this REE-equivalence point, the
CM economies are such that ∂κCM/∂σ = (1− γ)2/[(1− γ)2 + σηγ(2− γ)]2 > 0. We summa-
rize these intermediate observations in Lemma 1. In short, what this means is that for σ > σˆ
away from CM(σˆ) ≡ CD(σˆ), a CM economy with higher risk aversion will face a steeper REE
monetary-police trade-off between domestic inflation and output gap.
Lemma 1 Assume φ↘ 0.
• IM and CM have equivalent REE characterizations when σ = σ∗ := 1−γ
η(2−γ) ⇒ κ2 = 0. Further-
more, in the IM economy we have ∂κ2/∂σ < 0.
• CM and CD have equivalent REE characterizations when σ = σˆ := 1η . Furthermore, in the CM
economy, ∂κCM/∂σ > 0.
IM versus CM. We are now ready to show that the equilibrium policy trade-off between
domestic inflation and output gap (conditional on given agents’ expectations) can be steeper in
IM than CM, when agents are sufficiently risk averse. First, consider the IM economy. We can
equivalently derive the equilibrium relation between output gap and the real exchange rate,
using the IS (3.2) and UIP (3.3) relations, as
q˜t = −µ−1(1− γ)x˜t + µω(1− γ)Et x˜t+1 + [1+ µ−1(1− γ)χ]Etq˜t+1 + µ−1(1− γ)et + ut. (4.9)
Using (4.9) in the Phillips relation (3.1), we can equivalently write the incomplete-markets equi-
librium conditional trade-off between domestic inflation and output gap as
piH,t = βEtpiH,t+1 + λκ
IM x˜t + λκ2vt,
vt := µω(1− γ)Et x˜t+1 + 1− µ−1(1− γ)χEtq˜t+1 + µ−1(1− γ)et + ut,
(4.10)
where κ IM = κ1 − κ2µ−1(1− γ) ≡ κCD + σγ1−γ − κ2µ−1(1− γ), and vt is another representation
of the endogenous cost-push term that arises under the incomplete-markets equilibrium. In this
representation we can also see that the cost push term ωt not only depends on underlying
shocks, but it also depends on random variables that are conditional expectations of future
output and real exchange rate gaps. The first term comprising κ IM captures the direct effect of
output gap on domestic inflation; the term κ2 captures the direct link between the real exchange
rate and domestic inflation; and the term µ−1(1− γ) is the indirect effect of output gap, via
adjustments in the ex-ante real interest rate in the IS relation, onto the real exchange rate in the
UIP.
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Now compare IM with CM. There are three cases to consider. From Lemma 1, it is clear
that when σ = σ∗, we have equivalent trade-offs in the two types of economies. When σ > σ∗,
κ2 < 0 and κ2 is increasingly more negative with increasing σ. This implies that κ IM > κCM.
Lastly, when we have σ < σ∗, the term κ2 becomes positive. However, it is ambiguous as to
how these trade-offs are ordered, for arbitrary parameters. Nevertheless, we can still deduce
that for σ ↘ 0 (i.e. small enough) the term µ−1 ↘ 0 so that the trade-offs across all economies
converge to the same limit of ϕ. This delivers us the following result which summarizes all
three cases.
Proposition 3 Consider identically parameterized economies IM(σ) and CM(σ).
1. If σ = σ∗, then the two economies have identical REE trade-offs.
2. If σ > σ∗, then IM(σ) has a steeper REE inflation-output-gap trade-off than CM(σ), where:
κ IM =
σ
1− γ − κ2µ
−1(1− γ)
> ϕ+
σ
(1− γ)2 + σηγ(2− γ) = κ
CM.
3. If σ∗ > σ↘ 0, then κ IM → κCD ↘ κCM ↘ ϕ.
CM versus CD. Next, compare CM with CD. Recall that a sufficient condition for CM to
exhibit equivalent REE as CD is when σ = σˆ := 1/η, which implies that κCM = σ+ ϕ = κCD.
Proposition 4 Consider identically parameterized economies CM(σ) and CD(σ).
1. If σ = σˆ, then CM(σ) and CD(σ) have equivalent REE.
2. If σ > σˆ, then
κCM = ϕ+
σ
(1− γ)2 + σηγ(2− γ)
< ϕ+ σ = κCD.
3. If σ < σˆ, then κCM > κCD.
Note that for empirically plausible η ∈ (1, 2) and γ ∈ (0, 1), σ∗ < σˆ. This implies that the
relevant range of σ that one ought to be concerned with is given by σ > σˆ > σ∗ > 0. Therefore,
Propositions 3 (part 2) and 4 (part 2) are the only quantitatively relevant propositions that we
will need to focus on later. These observations lead us to the following statement.13
13In general, if we introduce the possibility of imported intermediate goods on the production side, α ∈ (0, 1),
then an arbitrary setting of the elasticity of substitution between domestic labor and imported inputs, ν, may switch
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Proposition 5 Assume the quantitatively plausible case where σ > σˆ > σ∗ > 0. Then we have the
following ordering of (conditional) policy trade-offs:
κ IM > κCD > κCM.
Explaining the policy trade-off comparisons. To summarize, if we assume a quantitatively
plausible and sufficiently large risk aversion parameter σ for agents, then in the CM economy,
the conditional trade-off between domestic inflation and output gap is relatively flatter than
its IM and CD counterparts. In contrast, in our IM economy, the trade-off becomes steeper
relative to the same CD counterpart.
To explain these comparative trade-offs summarized in Propositions 3 and 4, we just need
to reconsider the channels that make up κ IM in the IM economy, and those that make up κCM
and κCD, respectively.
For plausible parametrization of σ > σˆ > σ∗, openness of the CM economy to trade,
γ ∈ (0, 1), reduces κCM relative to κCD. This is because openness under international market
completeness allows the small open economy to have access to perfect cross-country insurance
of its domestic fluctuations as shown in the condition (4.1). This renders the real exchange rate
as a complete shock absorber for the economy so that consumption is smoothed across coun-
tries, state-by-state and date-by-date. Thus innovations to domestic output gap in CM has a
weaker impact on domestic inflation than in CD, since domestic agents now can borrow or lend
(i.e. switch consumption expenditures) internationally in complete contingent claims markets.
This was originally pointed out by Clarida et al. [2001].
What then happens with the IM economy is that while domestic agents can borrow or lend
internationally to attempt to smooth out domestic fluctuations in consumption, they do not
have the perfect international risk sharing present in the case of CM. Risk sharing is only in
conditional expectations terms. Hence, the UIP-type condition (3.3). This shows up in relation
to domestic inflation, in reduced-form, as
κ IM ≡ κCD + σγ
1− γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ1: domestic marginal cost channel
+
[
−κ2µ−1(1− γ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
incomplete risk sharing channel
> 0
in (4.10) where µ ≈
[
1−γ
σ
] [
1− γ+ ηγ(2−γ)(σ)1−γ
]
. Observe that the first two terms κCD + σγ1−γ ≡ κ1
is what would have been the trade-off component due purely to output gap via the domestic
real marginal cost channel. In other words, these terms would capture qualitatively the same
the ordering κCM < κclosed < κ IM. However, given the plausible parametrization, this order is still preserved. This
general setting is dealt with in our Supplementary Appendix.
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explanations for the trade-off as in a purely CD economy, but one which is weakened by trade
openness, γ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the last term −κ2µ−1(1− γ) captures the additional channel
arising under international asset-market incompleteness. Recall from Section 3, the term κ2 en-
codes additional substitution and wealth effects on labor supply as a result of direct variations
in the international real exchange rate, which in turn determine variations in domestic inflation.
This term, under plausible parametrization of σ > σˆ > σ∗ is negative, and increasingly nega-
tive with σ. The interaction of κ2 with µ−1(1− γ) summarizes the indirect effect of innovations
through incomplete international risk sharing (via the domestic ex-ante real interest rate) onto
domestic inflation. Specifically, note that µ−1 is increasing in magnitude with risk aversion σ.
In words, the additional impact of incomplete markets is more severe on domestic inflation the
more agents dislike large reallocations of consumption across states and dates, since the real
exchange rate cannot be a complete-insurance shock absorber, unlike in the case of CM.
Also, note that market incompleteness affects the equilibrium relation between output gap
and the real interest rate, given by µ in (3.2). In the CM version this parameter would be µCM,
as defined in (4.5).
These explanations will help shed light on the implications of market incompleteness for
equilibrium determinacy under alternative policy rules later.
Managing expectations and endogenous cost push. Another observation, which we will
come back to later when discussing alternative policies, is that in (4.10), the endogenous cost-
push term vt, can play a vital linkage between stabilizing policies and expectations manage-
ment. The intuition works as follows. Under incomplete markets, we have an exacerbation of
the contemporaneous policy trade-off as stated in Proposition 5. However, if an interest-rate
policy can also “correctly” manipulate the conditional expectation terms in vt, then it can al-
leviate this trade-off somewhat. We say “correctly” because it is not clear that a policy that
directly responds to these expectational variables may be stabilizing. In fact, by doing so, it
may create more inflationary expectation spirals. On the contrary, as we will illustrate later,
managing these expectations indirectly by conditioning policy of past growth in the variables
will turn out to be more desirable, from an equilibrium determinacy perspective.
In contrast, in the CD and CM economies, this endogenous cost-push term is non-existent.
Thus, one would expect a policy that directly manipulates conditional expectations will not do
better in yielding stable rational expectations equilibrium in these environments.
However, if φ ↘ 0, then µ ≈ µCM. Therefore, the effect of market incompleteness in the
equilibrium relation between output gap and the real interest rate will be negligible.
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5 Implications for Policy Rules and REE Determinacy
In this section we show how the additional incomplete-asset-markets friction alters the space
of alternative policy rules that can feasibly deliver a unique REE. The main conclusion here
is that incomplete asset markets result in implications for REE stability under various policy
rules, that are drastically different to the well-known wisdom from the closed-economy [e.g.
Bullard and Mitra, 2002] and complete markets small-open-economy [e.g. Llosa and Tuesta,
2008] literature.
Unfortunately, the various REE determinacy characterizations for the IM economy cannot
be derived analytically, unlike its special cases of CM [see Llosa and Tuesta, 2008] and CD [see
Bullard and Mitra, 2002]. Nevertheless, we can illustrate our insights from Section 4 numeri-
cally.
Our baseline economy (IM) is parametrized in line with Llosa and Tuesta [2008].14 Llosa
and Tuesta [2008] use the same parametrization as Galı´ and Monacelli [2005] with the exception
of the constant relative risk aversion coefficient (σ), the inverse of Frisch labor supply elasticity
(ϕ), and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (η). For a majority of
parameters, we follow that of in Llosa and Tuesta [2008] for two reasons: (i) Ease of comparison
of their findings with ours in terms of the REE stability analyses; and (ii) The setting in Llosa
and Tuesta [2008] is a more general parametrization. Furthermore, these parameters does not
affect qualitatively the results, although they may have important quantitative effects. This is
especially true in the case of σ.15 We summarize the model parameters in Table 1.
Note that this set of parameters is also used for the limit economies CM and CD. That is, by
using the relevant composite parameters, we have: (i) The small open economy with complete
markets (“CM”): κ2 = 0, κ1 = κCM and µ = µCM; and, (ii) The closed economy (“CD”): γ = 0.
5.1 Numerical illustration of trade-offs
As a preliminary exercise we demonstrate, for the baseline parametrization, the REE policy
trade-off comparisons explained earlier in Section 4. From Table 2 we conclude the following.
First, the positive trade-off between domestic inflation and output gap, given by λκ1, is much
larger (i.e. around six times larger) with incomplete markets. The intuition for this was shown
in Proposition 5 along with its discussion. In short, in the absence of complete international risk
14For the generalized version of this model, we parametrize its additional imported production input compo-
nents according to McCallum and Nelson [1999].
15The goal in this paper is to understand the qualitative implications of incomplete markets on equilibrium
stability using a simple but salient model, and not to quantify or match business cycle regularities. However, we
do perform some sensitivity analysis in this parameter when it would be required. Results of these alternative
experiments are available from the authors.
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Table 1: Parametrization for IM model
Parameter Value Source
Risk aversion, σ 5 LT
Disutility of labor, ψ 1 GM
Inverse Frisch elasticity, ϕ 0.47 LT
Discount factor elasticity, φ 10−6
Steady state discount factor, β¯ 0.99 GM
Home-Foreign goods elasticity of substitution, η 1.5 LT
Share of Home goods in C, γ 0.4 GM
Elasticity of substitution between good varieties, ε 6 GM
Price stickiness probability, θ 0.75 GM
† GM: Galı´ and Monacelli [2005]; LT: Llosa and Tuesta [2008]
‡ In the generalized model with imported inputs there are two additional parameters
which we set according to McCallum and Nelson [1999]. These are the labor-imported-
input elasticity of substitution (v = −2) and the steady-state imported-input share of out-
put (δ = 0.144). See our Supplementary Appendix for this generalized model.
sharing, a given external shock to the small open economy cannot be fully insured against by
the single incomplete market claim. Hence the effect of the shock gets amplified or transmitted
more to domestic allocations via the inflation process. Second, the equivalent version of λκ1
in the closed economy (“CD”) is between the value in the incomplete market version and the
complete market version. Given that φ is very close to zero, the response of the output gap
to the interest rate, given by µ is the same in the two versions of open economies. Last, the
relation between the output gap and the interest rate, given by µ is much smaller in the closed
economy. The reason for this is as in Galı´ and Monacelli [2005] – viz. trade openness presents
an indirect terms of trade (or real exchange rate) variation on aggregate demand.
Table 2: Comparing REE characterizations
IM CM CD
λκ1 0.756 0.124 0.470
λκ2 −1.087 0 0
µ 1.032 1.032 0.200
Note: This is for the baseline
parametrization, where σ = 5.
5.2 Policy rules and REE (in)determinacy
Next, we study the implications of IM for REE stability under alternative monetary-policy
rules. Overall, we consider six classes of simple contemporaneous and forecast-based Taylor-
type monetary policy rules used in the literature [see e.g. Llosa and Tuesta, 2008; Bullard and
Mitra, 2002]. These are summarized in Table 3. For the main discussion hereinafter, we will
focus on the simple DITR rule, and then also discuss two other examples with the MERTR and
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Table 3: Alternative monetary policy rules
DITR rt = φpipiH,t + φx x˜t; Domestic inflation targeting
FB-DITR rt = φpiEt {piH,t+1}+ φxEt {x˜t+1} Forecast-based version of DITR
CPITR rt = φpipit + φx x˜t CPI inflation targeting rule
FB-CPITR rt = φpiEt {pit+1}+ φxEt {x˜t+1} Forecast-based CPITR
MERTR rt = φpipiH,t + φx x˜t + φs4 st Managed exchange rate rule
FB-MERTR rt = φpiEtpiH,t+1 + φxEt x˜t+1 + φsEt4 st+1 Forecast-based MERTR
† The elasticities φpi , φx, and, φs are non-negative policy reaction parameters. pit is the inflation rate of the CPI index.
∆st := st − st−1 denotes the growth rate in the nominal exchange rate St. In the paper we focus discussions on the
DITR, MERTR and FB-MERTR families.
FB-MERTR family of policy rules. We consider these examples here because they are sufficient
to illustrate the additional implications of our IM economy for stabilization policy. In particu-
lar, the endogenous cost-push term in the IM economy’s monetary-policy trade-off was shown
to depend on expectations of future variables and we conjectured that policy rules that can
manage these expectations may turn out to be more robust in a REE determinacy sense. We
relegate discussions on the other alternative policy rules to our Supplementary Appendix.
Where relevant, we will compare within each policy class, the REE stability and indetermi-
nacy implications across the three economies: (a) The small open economy with complete markets
(“CM”) limit; (b) the closed economy limit (“CD”); and (c) the encompassing small open economy
with incomplete markets model (“IM”).
Given each policy rule above, and the competitive equilibrium conditions (3.1), (3.2) and
(3.3), the equilibrium system can be reduced to
Etxt+1 = Axt + Cwt, (5.1)
where x := (piH, x˜, q˜), and w := (ε, u); and A := A(~θ,~φ) and C := C(~θ,~φ) depend on the
parameters in (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3), ~θ := (β,γ,λ, κ1, κ2,ω, µ,χ); and also the policy parameters
~φ := (φpi, φx, φs).
Local stability of a REE depends on the eigenvalues of matrix A. Following the terminol-
ogy of Blanchard and Kahn [1980], we can see that there are three non-predetermined vari-
ables. Therefore, the equilibrium under DITR will be determinate if the three eigenvalues of
A are outside the unit circle, whereas it will be indeterminate when at least one of the three
eigenvalues of A is inside the unit circle. Unfortunately, we are not able to obtain analytical
characterizations of the stability conditions for each class of policy rules. We numerically check
for determinate REE (and similarly check for multiplicity of REE) as functions of the policy
parameters. In particular, we consider φpi ∈ [0, 4] and φx ∈ [0, 4], as in Llosa and Tuesta [2008],
and vary φs where relevant.
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We will state the overall conclusions for our baseline model parametrisation. First, mar-
ket incompleteness results in an opposite conclusion to the finding in Llosa and Tuesta [2008].
Llosa and Tuesta [2008] showed that the set of admissible DITR (that respond to contemporane-
ous variables) inducing unique REE, in a small open economy with complete markets, is larger
than that in its closed-economy limit. In general, we find that market incompleteness makes
the admissible policy sets smaller than when we have the limit of the complete-markets small
open economy. In the specific case of the DITR, international asset market incompleteness also
reduces the admissible policy space relative to when we have the closed-economy limit. Sec-
ond, if the policy rules are of the forecast-based families (FB-DITR, FB-CPITR and FB-MERTR),
then market incompleteness in our model also shrinks the sets of these policies that can induce
unique REE, relative to their counterparts in the special case of the complete-markets small
open economy model. Third, if monetary policy can be described by simple policy rules, then
a contemporaneous rule (MERTR) that not only responds to domestic inflation and output gap,
but also to the real exchange rate growth, can greatly expand the feasible set of such policies in
inducing determinate rational expectations equilibrium. This result is also well-known in the
context of small open economies with complete markets [see e.g. Llosa and Tuesta, 2008].
DITR. Figure 1 reports the simulation results for DITR across the three economies, under the
baseline parametrization. Each shaded region refers to the set of DITR policy rules, indexed by
(φpi, φx), that would have induced a determinate (i.e. stable) REE in each of the economies CM,
CD, and IM. The complement set of each shaded region represents the region with multiple or
indeterminate REE.
[ Figure 1 about here. ]
Consider our baseline IM economy under the DITR family of policy rules. We observe that
the largest value of φpi for which REE indeterminacy arises is 1 which corresponds with φx = 0.
The largest value of φx for which we find indeterminacy is 4, which corresponds to φpi = 0.97.
In fact, the points (φpi, φx) = (0.97, 4) and (φpi, φx) = (1, 0) determine the length of the locus
in Figure 1 that separates the region of DITR policies that induce REE indeterminacy (i.e. to its
left) and region of DITR policies that induce REE stability (i.e. to its right).
From this figure, we can see that the monetary authority is not constrained if the policy
reaction to inflation φpi is larger than unity (i.e. the “Taylor principle”). However, provided
that φpi < 1, the smaller this policy parameter is, the greater the authority’s response to the
output gap.
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Further, from Figure 1, we can see a qualification of existing results [e.g. Llosa and Tuesta,
2008] that openness to trade reduces indeterminacy of REE under the DITR family of policy
rules. Now, openness to trade under complete markets (CM) reduces the set of DITR policy that
induces REE indeterminacy, compared to the CD economy. However, incomplete asset markets
(IM) expands the set of indeterminate REE from that of the CD economy. This observation is
new to the literature. In other words, while trade openness reduces the constraint for DITR
policy makers if markets are complete, this openness increases the constraints if markets are
incomplete. However, note that the above result requires that the parametrization of the CRRA
parameter σ be “sufficiently large”.
The intuition for this is not surprising once we recall our observations in Section 4.2, and
in particular, Proposition 5. As discussed in Section 4.2, and also numerically verified in Table
2, market incompleteness does two things: (i) it exacerbates the slope of the inflation-output-
gap trade-off; and (ii) it amplifies the shifts to this trade-off due to the endogenous cost-push-
real-exchange-rate channel. The additional sensitivity of inflation to output gap and the real
exchange rate in the Phillips curve means that a DITR policy maker in the IM economy will
have to counter movements in inflation much more than its counterparts in the CM or CD
economies, in order to deliver a determinate REE. Finally, under CM, the trade-off is flatter
than under CD. Thus the same observation as in Llosa and Tuesta [2008] applies here: That for
a given response to domestic inflation, a CM-DITR policy intending to deliver a determinate
or stable REE needs to respond less heavily to output gap than its counterpart one in the CD
setting, provided that the expenditure switching channel is sufficiently strong, i.e. ση > 1.
For completeness, we also consider numerical examples where σ is “small”, and in partic-
ular, when σ = σ∗ (equivalence between IM and CM) or σ = σˆ (equivalence between CM and
CD). The numerical results are reported in Table 4. From Propositions 3 and 4, we can already
Table 4: Regions of DITR policies that induce REE indeterminacy—alternative cases of σ
IM CM CD
σ Corners† (φpi , φx) Area‡ Corners† (φpi , φx) Area‡ Corners† (φpi , φx) Area‡
5 (baseline) (0.99, 0), (0.97, 4) 3.942 (1, 0), (0.67, 4) 3.336 (1, 0), (0.91, 4) 3.825
σˆ = 0.67 (0.99,0), (0.79,4) 3.580 (1,0), (0.59,4) 3.160 (1,0), (0.59,4) 3.160
σ∗ = 0.25 (0.99,0), (0.47,4) 2.923 (0.99,0), (0.47,4) 2.923 (1,0), (0.35,4) 2.673
0.15 (0.99,0), (0.39,4) 2.754 (0.99,0), (0.39,4) 2.754 (1,0), (0.24,4) 2.459
0.1 (0.99,0), (0.32,4) 2.614 (0.99,0), (0.32,4) 2.614 (1,0), (0.18,4) 2.322
† “Corners” refer to the two interior vertices of region of policies that yield indeterminate REE. See Figure 1 for an example of
the baseline parametrization with σ = 5.
‡ “Area” refers to the area of the polygonal region of policies that yield indeterminate REE. The sample policies in the relevant
region are given by the interior ”corners” and the origin (0, 0) and (0, 4) in (φpi , φx)-space.
expect the results for values of the CRRA parameter σ that are “too small”. The first row of
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Table 4 is the baseline case across all three economies—i.e. the tabulation of Figure 1. Next,
consider the second row as an example, where σ = σˆ (equivalence between CM and CD). This
example shows that the regions of DITR policies that induce REE stability (or indeterminacy)
are identical for the CM and CD economies. Moreover, the area of indeterminacy for the IM
economy is larger. The intuition for this comes from observing that the policy trade-off in this
case for IM, κ IMσˆ = κ
CD
σˆ +
σˆγ
1−γ − κ2µ−1(1− γ) > κCDσˆ ≡ κCMσˆ > 0 — i.e. it is steeper than the
equivalent CM and CD economies. We summarize the main finding above and its alternative
numerical results from Table 4 in the following three statements.
Result 1 Assume the DITR family of monetary policy rules. Comparing IM(σ) and the CM(σ) open
economies we observe that:
• If σ > σ∗ (i.e. κ2 < 0) then the set of DITR policy rules indexed by (φpi, φx) that would have
induced indeterminate (stable) REE is larger (smaller) in the IM(σ) economy.
• If σ ≤ σ∗ (i.e. κ2 ≤ 0) then the set of DITR policy rules indexed by (φpi, φx) that would have
induced indeterminate (or stable) REE is the same in IM(σ) and in CM(σ).
Result 2 Comparing the CD(σ) and the CM(σ) economies we observe that:
• If σ > σˆ, then the set of DITR policy rules indexed by (φpi, φx) that would have induced indeter-
minate (or stable) REE is smaller (larger) in the CM(σ) economy.
• If σ = σˆ, then the set of DITR policy rules indexed by (φpi, φx) that would have induced indeter-
minate (or stable) REE is the same in the CM(σ) economy and in the CD(σ) economy.
• If σ < σˆ, then the set of DITR policy rules indexed by (φpi, φx) that would have induced stable
(indeterminate) REE is larger (smaller) in the CD(σ) economy.
Result 3 Comparing the IM(σ) and the CD(σ) economies we observe that the set of DITR policy
rules that would have induced an indeterminate (stable) REE is always larger (smaller) in the open IM
economy.
These numerical results corroborate our theoretical insights from Propositions 3, 4 and 5
above. However, recall that some of these possibilities described above would be moot, from
a quantitative point of view, since one typically parametrizes σ ≥ 1, and for plausible calibra-
tions, we will have σ∗ < σˆ < σ < 1.
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MERTR. Consider the Managed Exchange Rate Taylor Rule (MERTR). Using the definition
of the nominal exchange rate, ∆st = ∆qt + pit − pi∗t , where without loss of generality we set
pi∗t = 0, we then obtain the relation that ∆st =
1
1−γ∆qt +piH,t. Using this, we have an equivalent
representation of the MERTR as
rt = (φpi + φs)piH,t + φx x˜t +
(
γφpi + φs
1− γ
)
(q˜t − q˜t−1), (5.2)
By combining this rule with the equilibrium conditions for the IM economy, we can again
characterize REE stability numerically.
Similarly, we can derive a representation of the MERTR for the case of the CM economy as
rt = (φpi + φs)piH,t +
(
φx +
τ(γφpi + φs)
1− γ
)
x˜t − τ(γφpi + φs)1− γ x˜t−1, (5.3)
where τ := σ(1−γ)
(1−γ)2+σηγ(2−γ) .
We fix φs = 0.6 as in Llosa and Tuesta [2008].16 Relative to the DITR, the admissible set
of the MERTR inducing determinate REE equilibrium is larger. However, relative to the CM
economy, asset market incompleteness in the IM economy reduces this set.
[ Figure 2 about here. ]
An interesting observation about this policy is its equivalence to one that also responds
to a quasi-difference in output gap growth in the CM economy. One can interpret this as a
policy that places a limit on the speed in the domestic-inflation-output-gap trade-off. It does
so by responding to a measure of output gap growth and growth in the domestic-goods price
level; and it thus is able to prevent a self-fulfilling prophecy spiral in unstable inflation. This
is achieved to a lesser degree by (5.2) in the IM economy, since it still faces a larger policy
trade-off. However, compared to the DITR policy, now the MERTR family of policies deal
with managing real exchange rate growth directly. By doing so, the policies can better regular
expectations of output gap and real exchange rates. The latter expectational variables feature in
the composition of the endogenous cost-push shock term vt in the policy trade-off (4.10). Thus
preventing a self-prophesying spiral in these variables through the endogenous cost-push term
is crucial. This point is made stronger if we contrast with the next class of policy rules that
attempt to manipulate expectations directly.
16Additional sensitivity results with respect to φs are available from the authors. We show that the qualitative
ordering of the sets of determinate or indeterminate equilibria are not affected by the feasible choice of this param-
eter.
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FB-MERTR. It can be shown that the FB-MERTR rule has an equivalent form of
rt = (φpi + φs)EtpiH,t+1 + φxEt x˜t+1 +
(
γφpi + φs
1− γ
)
(Etq˜t+1 − q˜t), (5.4)
in the IM economy, and,
rt = (φpi + φs)EtpiH,t+1 +
[
φx + τ
(
γφpi + φs
1− γ
)]
Et x˜t+1 − τ
(
γφpi + φs
1− γ
)
x˜t, (5.5)
in the CM economy, where τ := σ(1−γ)
(1−γ)2+σηγ(2−γ) .
Relative to CM economy, asset market incompleteness in the IM economy results in a
smaller admissible set of the FB-MERTR inducing determinate REE equilibrium.
[ Figure 3 about here. ]
This example policy illustrates our intuition in Section 4.2 most starkly. Now, instead of
responding to real exchange rate growth, the policy responds to expectations of real exchange
rate growth, inter alia. By doing so, we can see that this family of policies is less capable
of delivering stable REE. The intuition is that by responding directly to expections of future
variables, this exacerbates further the already larger domestic-inflation-output-gap trade-off in
the IM economy (relative to CM), by causing more self-fulfilling spirals in exchange rate and
inflation expectations, amplified through the endogenous cost-push term vt in (4.10).
Discussion. We have seen in the illustrations above, for a quantitatively plausible risk aver-
sion σ, that the existence of incomplete international risk sharing results in a reduction of the
sets of admissible rules inducing determinate REE, relative to when the environment is the
standard complete-markets small open economy; and where relevant, relative to when the
environment is the standard closed economy. However, given international asset market in-
completeness, the admissible set of stabilizing policy rules can be greatly expanded by a family
of simple policies that take into account contemporaneous real exchange rate growth as well.
In the Supplementary Appendix, we also discuss a similar result (with similar intuitions) for
the class of the CPITR rule.
These results make sense, since the additional constraints on policy in the incomplete-
markets setting, arose through: (i) an exacerbated conditional trade-off between domestic in-
flation and output gap; and (ii) the endogenous cost-push channel. As hinted earlier in Section
4.2, the latter gave us another means of preventing self-fulfilling multiple equilibria, or worse,
equilibrium instability. This other means is effected through monetary policies that can “cor-
rectly” manage expectations that affect the endogenous cost-push term. By smoothing out
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output gap and real exchange rates, it turns out that the CPITR and better yet, the MERTR poli-
cies are better at inducing a determinate rational expectations equilibrium. This is perhaps one
reason why practising small-open-economy inflation targeters do worry about exchange rate
management in the monetary policy designs.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have developed a small open economy whose monetary policy implications
are no longer similar to its closed-economy counterpart. We showed, in a transparent manner,
that asset market incompleteness essentially exposes the supply side of the model’s equilibrium
characterization to a notion of an endogenous cost-push shock. Our notion of an endogenous
cost-push trade-off here is different to existing models with complete markets [c.f. Monacelli,
2005]. In our model, this is a consequence of an irreducible and explicit exchange rate equi-
librium dynamic channel. Moreover, this term involves endogenous random variables that
comprise conditional expectations of future output gap and real exchange rate gap. We then
showed how this alters the relevant monetary-policy trade off between stabilizing domestic in-
flation and stabilizing output gap in an analytical and comparative way. Finally, we re-visit the
lessons on equilibrium determinacy under alternative rules in a small open economy. We show
that asset market incompleteness now results in opposite conclusions to the existing literature
utilizing the workhorse complete markets model.
While our model is a simple and transparent illustration of the relation between interna-
tional asset market incompleteness, equilibrium exchange rate irreducibility, and its implica-
tions for monetary policy trade-off and rational expectations equilibrium determinacy, it is
probably too simple for normative business-cycle and welfare analysis. These questions have
been addressed by larger and more quantitative models [see e.g. de Paoli, 2009b; Monacelli,
2005].
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Figure 1: Domestic inflation targeting rule (DITR) and indeterminacy regions
(shaded) for three economies. Each complementary region refers to stable REE
cases.
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Figure 2: Managed exchange rate targeting rule (MERTR) and indeterminacy for
three economies. Each complementary region refers to stable REE cases.
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Figure 3: Forecast-based managed exchange rate targeting rule (FB-MERTR) and
indeterminacy for three economies. Each complementary region refers to stable
REE cases.
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Supplementary Appendix
Anatomizing Incomplete-markets Small Open Economies: Policy
Trade-offs and Equilibrium Determinacy
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Not for publication
A Derived demand and pricing functions
Continuing from Section 2.1, recall that each optimally chosen Ct will be consistent with the household’s
intra-period choice of a home-produced final consumption good, CH,t and an imported final good CF,t,
where Ct is defined by a CES aggregator
Ct =
[
(1− γ) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η + γ
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
; γ ∈ (0, 1), η > 1.
Each type of final good, CH,t and CF,t, aggregates a variety of differentiated goods indexed by i, j ∈
[0, 1]: CH,t =
[∫ 1
0 CH,t (i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
, and CF,t =
[∫ 1
0 CF,t (j)
ε−1
ε dj
] ε
ε−1
, where ε > 1. Static expenditure
minimization by consumers result in the demand functions:
CH,t (i) =
(
PH,t (i)
PH,t
)−ε
CH,t, CF,t (j) =
(
PF,t (j)
PF,t
)−ε
CF,t (A.1)
for all i, j ∈ [0, 1], where the aggregate price levels are solved as
PH,t =
(∫ 1
0
PH,t (i)
1−ε di
) 1
1−ε
, PF,t =
(∫ 1
0
PF,t (j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
. (A.2)
Likewise, optimal consumption demand of final home and foreign goods can be derived, respectively,
as
CH,t = (1− γ)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct, CF,t = γ
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct.
Substitution of these demand functions into (2.7) yields the consumer price index as
Pt =
[
(1− γ) P1−ηH,t + γP1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η . (A.3)
B Optimal price-setting
We assumed in the paper a function R+ 3 Cat 7→ β(Cat ) ∈ (0, 1) that represents endogenous (aggregate
consumption dependent) one-period discounting. Note that for a fixed sequence of aggregate consump-
tion {Caτ}k−1τ=0 the k-period ahead endogenous discount factor is ∏k−1τ=0 β(Caτ), where β(Ca0) = 1.
B.1 The Calvo-style pricing problem
The monopolistically competitive firm i ∈ [0, 1] chooses pricing strategy {PH,t(i, ht)}. Given Markovian
public histories of states, ht := {z0, ..., zt}, we further restrict the optimal pricing strategy to belong to a
class induced by stationary pricing decision functions P˜H,t such that P˜H,t(i, zt[ht]) = P˜H(i, zt).
Let the aggregate price in the home goods industry H, in time t+ k and state zt+k, be PH,t+k(zt+k) :=
PH,t+k. The aggregate domestic and foreign consumption demands are, respectively, CH,t+k(zt+k) :=
CH,t+k and C∗H,t+k(zt+k) := C
∗
H,t+k. The output of firm i in that state and date is then Yt+k(i, zt+k) :=
1
Yt+k(i). The demand faced by firm i in state zt+k, if the price P˜H,t(i, zt) := P˜H,t(i) still prevails (with
probability θk) in period t + k is given by
Yt+k(i) =
(
P˜H,t(i)
PH,t+k
)−ε [
CH,t+k + C∗H,t+k
]
, (B.1)
where we have suppressed the explicit state-dependence notation.
Let ξt := UC[C(zt)]. The firm i solves the following expected total discounted nominal profit maxi-
mization problem:
max
P˜H,t(i)
∞
∑
k=0
Et
{(
t+k−1
∏
τ=t
β(Caτ)
)
ξt+1
ξt
[
PH,t(i)−MCnt+k
]
Yt+k(i)
}
, (B.2)
subject to (B.1).
B.2 Optimal pricing plan in a symmetric pricing equilibrium
The first order condition with respect to P˜H,t(i) is
Et
{
∞
∑
k=0
θk
(
t+k−1
∏
τ=t
β(Caτ)
)
ξt+k
ξt
Yt+k(i)
[
P˜H,t(i)−
(
ε
ε− 1
)
MCnt+k
]}
= 0. (B.3)
We re-write the problem in real terms, by dividing both sides of (B.3) with the aggregate home-goods
price level, PH,t:17
Et
{
∞
∑
k=0
θk
(
t+k−1
∏
τ=t
β(Caτ)
)
ξt+k
ξt
Yt+k(i)
[
P˜H,t(i)
PH,t
−
(
ε
ε− 1
)(
PH,t+k
PH,t
)
MCt+k
]}
= 0. (B.4)
where real marginal cost in time t + k and state zt+k is MCt+k =:
MCnt+k
PH,t+k
. We restrict attention to a
symmetric pricing equilibrium.
Definition 2 A symmetric pricing equilibrium is a stationary Markovian strategy such that {P˜H,t(i, zt)}∞t=0 =
{P˜H,t(zt)}∞t=0 for all firms i ∈ [0, 1] that reset prices at time t, and {P˜H,t(zt)}∞t=0 satisfies (B.4).
C Deriving the log-linear equilibrium system
In this appendix we provide the details of the log-linearization of the three key conditions that locally
approximate the equilibrium characterizations of recursive equilibrium in the model.
17This also renders the characterization of optimal pricing in terms of stationary variables.
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C.1 Optimal consumer plan and UIP
By log linearizing the previous conditions (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6), and by imposing the equilibrium condi-
tion Ct = Cat , we obtain that the optimal consumer’s plan is approximately characterized by:
18
σct = wt − pt − ϕnt, (C.1)
− (σ− φ) ct = rt −Et {pit+1} − σEt {ct+1}+ φϑ, (C.2)
− (σ− φ) ct = r∗t − qt +Et {qt+1} − σEt {ct+1}+ φϑ, (C.3)
where qt denotes the percentage deviation from steady state of the real exchange rate Qt; pit+1 is the
rate of change in the domestic consumer price index from t to t + 1, i.e., pit+1 = pt+1 − pt; and r∗t is
the foreign interest rate, i.e., r∗t = i∗t − Et
{
pi∗t+1
}
, with pi∗t+1 denoting the inflation rate of the foreign
consumer price index. Without loss of generality, we will assume that r∗t is just a (linear) function of
y∗t .19 In order to maintain the same sign of slope of the Euler equation as in Galı´ and Monacelli [2005]
we will require that σ− φ > 0. This requirement is consistent with our assumption, following Ferrero et
al. [2010], on the subjective discount factor (φ↘ 0) and that is has negligible qualitative and quantitative
consequences on the monetary policy problem.
The log-linear form for the consumption index (2.7) is given by:
ct = (1− γ) cH,t + γcF,t, (C.4)
where cH,t is also an index of consumption of domestically produced goods; cF,t is an index of imported
goods; and γ ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of openness. The domestic consumer price index (A.3) is
log-linearized as
pt = (1− γ) pH,t + γpF,t, (C.5)
where pH,t is the price index for domestically produced goods; and pF,t is the price index for imported
goods. Similarly, domestic output in log- linear form is given in equilibrium by
yt = (1− γ) cH,t + γc∗H,t, (C.6)
where c∗H,t is the export of domestically produced goods. The optimal allocation of expenditure within
18Henceforth, lower-case letters will denote the logarithms of the corresponding upper-case variables.
19It has been shown in Galı´ and Monacelli [2005] that if we assume the rest of the world as a limiting closed
economy under a first-best and flexible price competitive equilibrium, then y∗t is equal to its potential output. That
is y∗t is approximately a linear function of its exogenous technology a∗t , y∗t = b(θ˜)a∗t , where b(θ˜) denotes a scalar
function of the closed economy’s underlying taste and technology parameters θ˜. Thus it suffices to characterize the
approximate equilibrium solution of this model as linear functions of (at, y∗t ).
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each category of goods yields the following demands:
cH,t = η (pt − pH,t) + ct, (C.7)
cF,t = η (pt − pF,t) + ct, (C.8)
c∗H,t = η (st + p∗t − pH,t) + c∗t . (C.9)
We assumed that the law of one price holds at all periods, so that pF,t = st + p∗t . Combining this
expression with the consumption price index (C.5) and the definition of the real exchange rate, we
obtain that
pt − pH,t =
(
γ
1− γ
)
qt. (C.10)
From this equation we directly follow that the rate of change in the price index of the domestically
produced goods (or domestic inflation) differs from the inflation rate of the domestic consumer price
index. In particular we obtain that
pit − piH,t =
(
γ
1− γ
)
(qt − qt−1) , (C.11)
where piH,t is the domestic inflation rate. Observe that the gap between the two inflation rates is propor-
tional to the variation in the real exchange rate, with the degree of proportionality determined by the
degree of openness γ.
By combining (C.10) with (C.6), (C.7) and (C.9), we obtain that domestic output is equal to
yt = (1− γ) ct +
[
ηγ (2− γ)
1− γ
]
qt + γy∗t , (C.12)
where we have used the fact that the foreign economy is large, which implies that the weight in the
foreign composite consumption C∗t of the domestic goods is negligible, so that y∗t = c∗t .
C.1.1 The UIP condition and incomplete international risk sharing
From the optimality conditions for the consumers’ problem we can derive the uncovered interest parity
(UIP) condition. More specifically, from the conditions (C.2) and (C.3) we obtain the following log-linear
approximation of the UIP condition:
rt = r∗t +Et {pit+1} − qt +Et {qt+1} . (C.13)
Under complete markets the Euler equations of the domestic and the foreign countries provide a tight
state-by-state and date-by-date relation linking domestic consumption with foreign consumption and
real exchange rate[see. e.g. Galı´ and Monacelli, 2005]. In particular, under our utility function (2.2)
this relationship is in log-linear terms given by: ct = c∗t +
(
1
σ
)
qt. This implies that the dynamics of
output and the real exchange rate are perfectly correlated. However, this is no longer true in the case
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of incomplete asset markets. As Chari et al. [2002] show, in this case the relation between real exchange
rate and consumption only holds in conditional expectation terms. In particular, combining condition
(C.3) with the Euler equation of the foreign economy yields
Et {qt+1} − qt =
[
σEt
{
y∗t+1
}− (σ− φ) y∗t ]− [σEt {ct+1} − (σ− φ) ct] , (C.14)
where we have also used the condition y∗t = c∗t . Therefore, output and real exchange are not perfect
correlated, so that we need equation (C.13) to characterize the full equilibrium dynamics of our model
as we will show below [see also ?Benigno and Thoenissen, 2008].
Using (C.13) and (C.11), we obtain the following dynamic equation for the gap in the real exchange
rate, as found in the main paper:
q˜t = Et {q˜t+1} − (1− γ) [rt −Et {piH,t+1}] + ut. (3.3)
C.2 Approximating the supply side
Log-linearizing (2.8) around the zero-inflation steady state, we obtain that the aggregate output in loga-
rithmic terms is given by
yt = at + nt, (C.15)
Moreover, from cost minimization we obtain
nt = yt + [mct − (wt − pt) + (pH,t − pt)] , (C.16)
where mct := ln(MCnt /PH,t)− ln[(1− ε)/ε] is the percentage deviation in real marginal cost from steady
state.
C.2.1 Real marginal cost
By combining (2.9) with (C.1), (C.12), (C.15) we get
mct =
{[
σ+ ϕ (1− γ)
1− γ
]
yt +
[
γ
(1− γ) −
σηγ (2− γ)
(1− γ)2
]
qt − (1+ ϕ) at −
(
γ(1+ ϕ)
1− γ
)
y∗t
}
.(C.17)
In the flexible price equilibrium, we obtain that
0 =
{[
σ+ ϕ (1− γ)
1− γ
]
yt +
[
γ
(1− γ) −
σηγ (2− γ)
(1− γ)2
]
qt − (1+ ϕ) at −
(
γ(1+ ϕ)
1− γ
)
y∗t
}
.(C.18)
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Subtracting (C.18) from (C.17) we obtain real marginal cost deviations as a function output gap and real
exchange rate gap deviations:
mct =
{[
σ+ ϕ (1− γ)
1− γ
]
x˜t +
[
γ
(1− γ) −
σηγ (2− γ)
(1− γ)2
]
q˜t
}
. (C.19)
C.2.2 Optimal pricing policy function
For small perturbations around a zero-inflation steady state, (B.4) can be approximated to first-order
accuracy as:
Et
{
∞
∑
k=0
[β (Cass) θ]
k ξssYss(i)
[
p˜H,t − ln
(
PH,t+k
PH,t
)
−mct+k
]}
, (C.20)
where
p˜H,t := ln
(
P˜H,t
PH,t
)
, mct := ln
(
MCnt
PH,t
)
− ln
(
ε− 1
ε
)
.
Define PˆH,t = ln(PH,t/PH,ss). So then (C.20) can be re-written as(
1
1− β (Cass) θ
)
p˜H,t = Et
∞
∑
k=0
[β (Cass) θ]
k [PˆH,t+k + mct+k]−( 11− β (Cass) θ
)
PˆH,t
⇒ p˜H,t + PˆH,t = (1− β (Cass) θ)Et
∞
∑
k=0
[β (Cass) θ]
k [PˆH,t+k + mct+k] .
By the law of iterated expectations, this can be written recursively as
p˜H,t + PˆH,t = [1− β (Cass)]
(
PˆH,t + mct
)
+ [β (Cass) θ]Et
(
p˜H,t+1 + PˆH,t+1
)
⇒ p˜H,t = [1− β (Cass) θ]mct + [β (Cass) θ]Et ( p˜H,t+1 + piH,t+1) . (C.21)
Recall that in the ?-style model, by the law of large numbers, the evolution of the aggregate home goods
price level is such that
P1−εH,t = (1− θ)P˜1−εH,t + θP1−εH,t−1.
A log-linear approximation of this yields a linear relationship between home goods price inflation,
piH,t := ln(PH,t/PH,t−1) and the percentage deviation of the optimal price from the aggregate price
level:
piH,t =
1− θ
θ
p˜H,t.
6
Using this identity, and the one-period ahead forecast of the same identity, in (C.21), we obtain the
characterization of the approximately log-linear optimal pricing function p˜H,t in terms of a forward-
looking Phillips curve:
piH,t = βEt {piH,t+1}+
[
(1− θ) (1− θβ)
θ
]
mct, (C.22)
with β := β(Css), where Css is the level of domestic consumption at the zero-inflation steady state.
Combining (C.22) with (C.19), we obtain
piH,t = βEt {piH,t+1}+ λ (κ1 x˜t + κ2q˜t) , (3.1)
where
λ =
[
(1− θ) (1− θβ)
θ
]
,
κ1 = ϕ+
σ
1− γ , κ2 = −
σηγ(2− γ)
(1− γ)2 +
γ
(1− γ) .
Equation (3.1) is almost identical, to first-order accuracy, to the Phillips curve derived in models such
as Galı´ and Monacelli [2005] and Clarida et al. [2001]. What is different is that the one-period discount
factor at the deterministic steady state is now a function of fundamental outcomes in the steady-state
competitive equilibrium. In this case, it will be a function of steady-state aggregate consumption, Css.
More generally, if we do not focus on local linearized dynamics around the deterministic steady state, the
global dynamics of inflation will also depend non-linearly on the endogenous discount factor function
β : R+ → (0, 1).
As in the closed economy a change in the domestic output has a positive effect on the domestic
inflation rate. In our model the size of this effect depends on the degree of openness γ and on the
productive dependence α (or, equivalently, δ). An increase in the domestic output has an effect on the
marginal cost through: (i) an increase in the equilibrium level of employment, that is captured by the first
term ϕ in κ1; (ii) a rise in the terms of trade given by the second term in κ1, which is negatively related
with the degree of opennes γ; and (iii) an increase in the equilibrium level of the imported intermediate
good given by the second term in λ, which is positively related with the productive dependence α (or,
equivalently, δ).
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C.3 Approximating the demand side
By combining (C.2) with (C.11) and (C.12), we obtain after some simple algebra that
yt =
(
σ
σ− φ
)
Et {yt+1} −
(
1− γ
σ− φ
)
[it −Et {piH,t+1}]
+
[
γ
σ− φ −
σηγ (2− γ)
(1− γ) (σ− φ)
]
Et {qt+1}
−
[
γ
σ− φ −
ηγ (2− γ)
1− γ
]
qt −
(
σγ
σ− φ
)
Et
{
y∗t+1
}
+ γy∗t
−φϑ(1− γ)
σ− φ (C.23)
C.4 Potential output and real exchange rate derivations
Here, we show that the potential output yt and real exchange rate qt are affine functions of exogenous
random technology and foreign output, respectively, at and y∗t .
We first charaterize the equilibrium when prices are fully flexible, i.e., mct = 0. From (C.1), (C.15),
and (2.9),we obtain that the equilibrium with flexible prices
σct + ϕyt +
[
γ
1− γ
]
qt − (1+ ϕ) at = 0. (C.24)
Moreover, combining the last equation with (C.12), we also obtain
ct = Ω1at −Ω2qt −Ω3y∗t , (C.25)
where
Ω1 =
1+ ϕ
σ+ ϕ (1− γ) ,
Ω2 =
[
1
σ+ ϕ (1− γ)
]
and
Ω3 =
γϕ
σ+ ϕ (1− γ) .
Using (C.25) and (C.14), we derive that
qt =
[
(1− σΩ2)
1− (σ− φ)Ω2
]
Et
{
qt+1
}
+
[
Ω1
1− (σ− φ)Ω2
]
[σEt {at+1} − (σ− φ) at]
−
[
1+Ω3
1− (σ− φ)Ω2
] [
σEt
{
y∗t+1
}− (σ− φ) y∗t ] .
Hence, by solving forward the previous dynamic equation, we can see that the level of qt at the friction-
less equilibrium only depends on the exogenous stochastic variables at and y∗t . From (C.24) and (C.25)
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we check that the previous conclusion is also true for the case of the levels of yt and ct.
From (C.18) and (C.23) we can derive the following condition on the equilibrium with flexible prices:
yt =
(
σ
σ− φ
)
Et
{
yt+1
}
−
[
1− γ
σ+ ϕ (1− γ)
] [
γ
(1− γ) −
σηγ (2− γ)
(1− γ)2
]
qt
+
[
σ (1− γ)
(σ− φ) [σ+ ϕ (1− γ)]
]
×
[
γ
(1− γ) −
σηγ (2− γ)
(1− γ)2
]
Et
{
qt+1
}
+
[
(1− γ) (1+ ϕ)
σ+ ϕ (1− γ)
]
at −
[
σ (1− γ) (1+ ϕ)
(σ− φ) [σ+ ϕ (1− γ)]
]
Et {at+1}
+
[
σγ
σ+ ϕ (1− γ)
]
y∗t −
[
γσ2
(σ− φ) [σ+ ϕ (1− γ)]
]
Et
{
y∗t+1
}
. (C.26)
It is straightforward to deduce that yt will just be a linear function in (at, y
∗
t ). 
C.5 Deriving the output gap IS relation
Subtracting (C.26) from (C.23), we obtain
x˜t =
(
σ
σ− φ
)
Et {x˜t+1} −
[
γ
σ− φ −
ηγ (2− γ)
1− γ
]
q˜t
+
[
γ
σ− φ −
σηγ (2− γ)
(1− γ) (σ− φ)
]
Et {q˜t+1}
−
(
1− γ
σ− φ
)
[it −Et {piH,t+1}] + ξt, (C.27)
with
ξt =
[
ηγϕ (2− γ)
σ+ ϕ (1− γ) +
(
1− γ
σ+ ϕ (1− γ)
)
γ
(1− γ) −
γ
σ− φ
]
qt
+
[
γ
σ− φ −
σηγϕ (2− γ)
(σ− φ) [σ+ ϕ (1− γ)]
−
(
σ
σ− φ
)(
1− γ
σ+ ϕ (1− γ)
)
γ
(1− γ)
]
Et
{
qt+1
}
−
[
(1− γ) (1+ ϕ)
σ+ ϕ (1− γ)
]
at +
[
σ (1− γ) (1+ ϕ)
(σ− φ) [σ+ ϕ (1− γ)]
]
Et {at+1}
−
[
γϕ (1− γ)
σ+ ϕ (1− γ)
]
y∗t +
[
γσϕ (1− γ)
(σ− φ) [σ+ ϕ (1− γ)]
]
Et
{
y∗t+1
}− φϑ (1− γ)
σ− φ ,
where ξt is a stochastic, exogenous variable as can be followed from the previous characterization of the
frictionless equilibrium. Finally, by introducing (3.3) into (C.27), we directly obtain equation (3.2) in the
main text, where
et = ξt −
[
γ
σ− φ −
ηγ (2− γ)
1− γ
]
ut.
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D Generalized IM Model
Consider a generalized version of the IM model. Now, the only addition is that each domestic firm
i ∈ [0, 1] produces a differentiated good using a CES technology
Yt
(
i, ht
)
=
{
α
[
AtNdt
(
i, ht
)]ν
+ (1− α) [IMt (i, ht)]ν} 1ν ; α ∈ (0, 1],−∞ ≤ ν ≤ 1, (D.1)
where Ndt (i, h
t) is labor hired by the firm; and IMt(i) is an index of imported intermediate goods.20 the
random variable At := exp{at} is an exogenous embodied labor productivity.
The production cost-minimization problem for the firm is:
min Pt
(
ht
) {
Qt
(
ht
)
IMt
(
i, ht
)
+
Wt
(
ht
)
Pt (ht)
Ndt
(
i, ht
)}
.
subject to (2.8). The first-order conditions with respect to optimal labor and intermediate-imports are
Wt
(
ht
)
Pt (ht)
= α
MCnt
(
ht
)
Pt (ht)
Aνt
(
Yt
(
ht
) (
i, ht
)
Ndt (i, ht)
)1−ν
,
and
Qt
(
ht
)
= (1− α) MC
n
t
(
ht
)
Pt (ht)
(
Yt
(
i, ht
)
IMt (i, ht)
)1−ν
,
respectively, where MCnt is nominal marginal cost.
With a homogeneous of degree one production function the first-order conditions (for cost mini-
mization with respect to labor) can be written in the aggregate as
Wt
(
ht
)
Pt (ht)
= α
MCnt
(
ht
)
Pt (ht)
Aνt
(
Yt
(
ht
)
Ndt (ht)
)1−ν
(D.2)
and
Qt
(
ht
)
= (1− α) MC
n
t
(
ht
)
Pt (ht)
(
Yt
(
ht
)
IMt (ht)
)1−ν
, (D.3)
where MCnt is nominal marginal cost.
After some derivations, it can be shown that the REE for this economy is summarized by the follow-
ing definition.
Definition 3 (General Incomplete Markets (IM)) Given a monetary policy process {rt}t∈N and exogenous
processes {et, ut}t∈N, a (locally approximate) rational expectations competitive equilibrium (REE) in the IM
20This intermediate good can be interpreted as two equivalent forms. On the one hand, we can assume that
the imported goods can be either devoted to consumption CF,t or used as a production input IMt. On the other
hand, we can assume that the domestic economy imports two differentiated goods: consumption goods CF,t and
intermediated goods IMt.
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model is a bounded stochastic process {piH,t, x˜t, q˜t}t∈N satisfying:
piH,t = β¯Et {piH,t+1}+ λ (κ1 x˜t + κ2q˜t) , (D.4)
x˜t = vEt {x˜t+1} − µ [rt −Et {piH,t+1}] + χEt {q˜t+1}+ et, (D.5)
q˜t = Et {q˜t+1} − (1− γ) [rt −Et {piH,t+1}] + ut. (D.6)
where β = β(Css),
λ =
(1− ν)(1− δ)
1− ν+ δϕ
[
(1− θ) (1− θβ¯)
θ
]
,
κ1 = ϕ+
σ
1− γ , κ2 =
δ(1− ν+ ϕ)
(1− γ)(1− ν)(1− δ) −
σηγ(2− γ)
(1− γ)2 +
γ
(1− γ) ;
v =
σ
σ− φ , µ =
[
1− γ
σ− φ
] [
1− γ+ ηγ (2− γ) (σ− φ)
1− γ
]
, and, χ =
ηγφ (2− γ)
(1− γ) (σ− φ) ;
where δ = (1− α)(IMss/Yss)ν, with IMss and Yss as the stationary values of imported intermediate good and
aggregate output, respectively.
D.1 Parameters in the general IM model
The generalized IM economy is parametrized in line with Llosa and Tuesta [2008] and McCallum and
Nelson [1999]. Llosa and Tuesta [2008] use the same parametrization as Galı´ and Monacelli [2005] with
the exception of the constant relative risk aversion coefficient (σ), the inverse of Frisch labor supply
elasticity (ϕ), and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (η). For a majority
of parameters, we follow that of in Llosa and Tuesta [2008] for two reasons: (i) Ease of comparison of
their findings with ours in terms of the REE stability analyses; and (ii) The setting in Llosa and Tuesta
[2008] is a more general parametrization. Furthermore, these parameters does not affect qualitatively
the results, although they may have important quantitative effects. This is especially true in the case
of σ.21 The parameter v is from McCallum and Nelson [1999]. We summarize the model parameters in
Table 1.
[ Table 1 about here. ]
Note that this set of parameters is later used to consider the limits of our model. That is, by using the
relevant composite parameters, we have: (i) The small open economy with complete markets (“CM”):
κ2 = 0, κ1 = κc1 and µ = µ
c; and, (ii) The closed economy (“CD”): γ = 0 and α = 1 (i.e., δ = 0).
21The goal in this paper is to understand the qualitative implications of incomplete markets on equilibrium
stability using a simple but salient model, and not to quantify or match business cycle regularities. However, we
do perform some sensitivity analysis in this parameter when it would be required. Results of these alternative
experiments will be readily made available upon request.
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D.2 Numerical values of equilibrium relations
By using our baseline parametrization we can now sign the reduced-form parameters in the equilibrium
relations between variables in the approximation of the competitive equilibrium (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3). We
report this in Table 5.
[ Table 5 about here. ]
Recall that the only unclear equilibrium relation (in terms of sign or direction) is the slope of output
gap with respect to the real exchange rate in the Phillips curve (3.1), given by λκ2. From a Mundell-
Fleming-type intuition, one should expect that without imported inputs this value should be negative.
We show that in our baseline economy, this value is also negative with imported inputs. In fact, we
obtain that κ2 is positive if and only if v ∈ (0.92337, 1). Therefore, the aforementioned income effects of
the exchange rate variations dominates.
At this point, it is convenient to enumerate the differences between the incomplete market version
and the complete market version in terms of equilibrium relations. Remember that these differences are
in the relations λκ1, λκ2 and µ. Table 2 reports the differences across the economies with and without
openness in production, and with and without market incompleteness.
[ Table 6 about here. ]
From Table 2 we conclude the following. First, the positive trade-off between domestic inflation
and output gap, given by λκ1, is much larger (i.e. around six times larger) with incomplete markets,
regardless of the presence of an imported intermediate input channel (indexed by δ). The intuition is
quite standard. In the absence of complete international risk sharing, a given external shock to the small
open economy cannot be fully insured against by the single incomplete market claim. Hence the effect
of the shock gets amplified or transmitted more to domestic allocations via the inflation process.
Second, the relationship between domestic-goods inflation rate and output gap, given by λκ1, is
decreasing with δ (openness in production). Observe the Phillips curve relation in (3.1). Since there
is some substitutability in the inputs in the production technology, more reliance (i.e. higher δ) on the
imported intermediate input means a substitution away from the labor input, such that all else equal,
the effect of the labor cost channel on the inflation-real marginal-cost channel via λκ1 is then smaller.
Third, the relationship between domestic-goods inflation rate and output gap, given by λκ1, in the
closed economy (“CD”) is between the value in the incomplete market version and the complete market
version.
Fourth, the openness in production, given by δ, reduces the negative effect of the depreciation of the
exchange rate on the inflation rate, given by λκ2. This is obvious because with δ = 0, the production
effect determining κ2 disappears.
Fifth, given that φ is very close to zero, the response of the output gap to the interest rate, given by
µ is the same in the two versions of open economies. Last, the response of the output gap to the interest
rate, given by µ is much smaller in the closed economy. The reason for this is as in Galı´ and Monacelli
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[2005] – viz. trade openness presents an indirect terms of trade (or real exchange rate) variation on
aggregate demand.
D.3 Implications for Instrument Rules and Determinacy
Overall we consider six classes of simple contemporaneous and forecast-based Taylor-type monetary
policy rules used in the literature [see e.g. Llosa and Tuesta, 2008; Bullard and Mitra, 2002].
(i) the domestic (producer price) inflation targeting rule (DITR):
rt = φpipiH,t + φx x˜t; (D.7)
(ii) a forecast-based version of the DITR (or FB-DITR):
rt = φpiEt {piH,t+1}+ φxEt {x˜t+1} ; (D.8)
(iii) the consumer price index inflation targeting rule (CPITR):
rt = φpipit + φx x˜t; (D.9)
(iv) a forecast-based CPITR (or FB-CPITR):
rt = φpiEt {pit+1}+ φxEt {x˜t+1} ; (D.10)
(v) the managed exchange rate targeting rule (MERTR):
rt = φpipiH,t + φx x˜t + φs4 st; (D.11)
(vi) a forecast-based MERTR (FB-MERTR):
rt = φpiEtpiH,t+1 + φxEt x˜t+1 + φsEt4 st+1, (D.12)
where the elasticities φpi , φx, and, φs are non-negative reaction parameters. In the paper, we discussed
rules (i) DITR, (v) MERTR, and (vi) FB-MERTR. We present and discuss the other cases here in this
appendix.
Where relevant, we will compare within each policy class, the REE stability and indeterminacy im-
plications across the three economies: (a) The small open economy with complete markets (“CM”) limit;
(b) the closed economy limit (“CD”); and (c) the encompassing small open economy with incomplete markets
model (“IM”).
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Given each policy rule above, and the competitive equilibrium conditions (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3), the
equilibrium system can be reduced to
Etxt+1 = Axt + Cwt, (D.13)
where x := (piH , x˜, q˜), and w := (ε, u); and A := A(~θ,~φ) and C := C(~θ,~φ) depend on the parameters in
(3.1), (3.2) and (3.3),~θ := (β,γ,λ, κ1, κ2,ω, µ,χ); and also the policy parameters ~φ := (φpi , φx, φs).
Local stability of a REE depends on the eigenvalues of matrix A. Following the terminology of
Blanchard and Kahn [1980], we can see that there are three non-predetermined variables. Therefore, the
equilibrium under DITR will be determinate if the three eigenvalues of A are outside the unit circle,
whereas it will be indeterminate when at least one of the three eigenvalues of A is inside the unit circle.
Unfortunately, we are not able to obtain analytical characterizations of the stability conditions for each
class of policy rules. We numerically check for determinate REE (and similarly check for multiplicity of
REE) as functions of the policy parameters. In particular, we consider φpi ∈ [0, 4] and φx ∈ [0, 4], as in
Llosa and Tuesta [2008], and vary φs where relevant.
What we have shown previously, is that the inability of a small open economy to completely insure
its country-specific technology risk results in an endogenous trade-off for monetary policy. This out-
come does not exist in the canonical NK closed economy nor the complete-markets small open economy
models (recall the discussion in section 4). This feature poses additional restrictions on the admissibility
of the classes of policy rules in terms of inducing a determinate REE.
We will illustrate the following conclusions. First, market incompleteness results in an opposite
conclusion to the finding in Llosa and Tuesta [2008]. Llosa and Tuesta [2008] showed that the set of
admissible DITR (that respond to contemporaneous variables) inducing unique REE, in a small open
economy with complete markets, is larger than that in its closed-economy limit. In general, we find
that market incompleteness makes the admissible policy sets smaller than when we have the limit of
the complete-markets small open economy. In the specific case of the DITR, international asset market
incompleteness also reduces the admissible policy space relative to when we have the closed-economy
limit. Second, if the policy rules are of the forecast-based families (FB-DITR, FB-CPITR and FB-MERTR),
then market incompleteness in our model also shrinks the sets of these policies that can induce unique
REE, relative to their counterparts in the special case of the complete-markets small open economy
model. Third, if monetary policy can be described by simple policy rules, then a contemporaneous rule
(MERTR) that not only responds to domestic inflation and output gap, but also to the real exchange rate
growth, can greatly expand the feasible set of such policies in inducing determinate rational expecta-
tions equilibrium. This result is also well-known in the context of small open economies with complete
markets [see e.g. Llosa and Tuesta, 2008].
D.4 Additional policy rules and numerical results
FB-DITR. Figure 4 shows the sets of FB-DITR policies (D.8) that induce unique REE for our IM econ-
omy, the limit economy CM and also the limit of the CD economy. Again, we see that the set of FB-DITR
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inducing indeterminate REE is larger than that of DITR, and the set of rules inducing indeterminate REE
is larger in the IM economy than in the CM economy. This set is larger in the CM economy than in the
CD economy.
[ Figure 4 about here. ]
This example policy illustrates that responding to expectations of future domestic inflation and out-
put may be counterproductive in achieving determinate REE. We can glean some intuition again from
the observations in Section 4.2. In particular, in the closed- and complete-market-open-economy limits,
the contemporaneous trade-off between domestic inflation and output gap is not conditioned at all on
expectational variables. Hence, a policy rule that responds to expectational variables will turn out to fuel
more instability or at least self-fulfilment in expectations. In a weaker sense, in the incomplete-markets
case, although the trade-off now depends on expectational variables, what is crucial is the indirect man-
agement of expectations of exchange rates in the policy response that would matter.
CPITR. Next we also consider a variation on the DITR, the CPI Inflation Targeting Rule (CPITR), as in
equation (D.9). However, the authority and agents in the economy know that in equilibrium, there is a
relationship between CPI, domestic inflation, and the real exchange rate, given by pit = piH,t +
γ
1−γ (q˜t −
q˜t−1). Then the CPITR can be equivalently written as
rt = φpipiH,t + φx x˜t +
γφpi
1− γ (q˜t − q˜t−1). (D.14)
Note that for the CM economy, we can use the complete cross-country risk sharing condition in (4.1),
so that CPITR in this limit economy becomes,
rt = φpipiH,t +
(
φx +
τγφpi
1− γ
)
x˜t − τγφpi1− γ x˜t−1, τ :=
σ(1− γ)
(1− γ)2 + σηγ(2− γ) , (D.15)
In the CD economy case, CPITR is identical to its DITR. As before, by combining (D.14), or (D.15), or
the DITR with the equilibrium characterizations in each of the respective three economies, we can then
numerically characterize the stability conditions for a REE under CPITR.
Figure 5 depicts our findings for these rules. Openness to trade under complete markets (CM) re-
duces the set of CPITR policy that induces REE indeterminacy, compared to the CD economy. However,
incomplete asset markets (IM) expands the set of CPITR policy that induces indeterminate REE from
that of the CM economy. Observe that qualitatively, the order of the indeterminacy sets under CPITR
are identical to DITR. Numerically there is a small gain in the stable REE regions for CM and IM.
[ Figure 5 about here. ]
The general intuition is consistent with our reasoning previously for DITR. However, the CPITR rules
also respond to real exchange rate growth in the IM economy. Such stabilizing rules help to regulate or
act as a speed check on expectations of the exchange rate and output gap; and these prevent even more
unstable expectational spiral in inflation, amplified through the endogenous cost-push term vt in (4.9).
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Hence there is some additional stability gain in using CPITR over the DITR rules. In the CM economy,
the class of CPITR rules is equivalently a speed check rule on output gap, as shown in (D.15).
FB-CPITR. Consider next, a forecast-based version of the CPITR or FB-CPITR in equation (D.10).
Again, using the CPI inflation relation with domestic inflation and real exchange rate gap, this rule can
be written as
rt = φpiEt {piH,t+1}+ φxEt {x˜t+1}+ γφpi1− γ (Et q˜t+1 − q˜t), (D.16)
for the baseline IM economy, and,
rt = φpiEt {piH,t+1}+
(
φx +
τγφpi
1− γ
)
Et {x˜t+1} −
(
τγφpi
1− γ
)
q˜t, (D.17)
in the case of the CM economy.
Compared to the CD economy, the set of FB-CPITR inducing determinate REE is smaller. However,
this set (CM) is larger than in the (IM) economy with FB-CPITR.
[ Figure 6 about here. ]
Again, this example policy illustrates that responding to expectations of future CPI inflation and output
may be counterproductive in achieving determinate REE. The intuition is as before. In the closed- and
complete-market-open-economy limits, the contemporaneous trade-off between domestic inflation and
output gap is not conditioned at all on expectational variables. Hence, a policy rule that responds to
some of these variable may turn out to deliver less cases of stabilizing policies. In a weaker sense, in the
incomplete-markets case, although the trade-off now depends on expectational variables, what is crucial
is the indirect management of exchange-rate expectations in the policy response, through managing
current growth, that would matter.
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Table 5: General IM model’s REE characterization
Composite Parameter Value
λ 0.0719
κ1 8.8033
κ2 −12.3424
v 1.0000
µ 1.0320
χ 3.2× 10−7
Table 6: Comparing REE characterizations—general model
IM CM CD
δ = 0.114 δ = 0 δ = 0.114 δ = 0 δ = γ = 0
λκ1 0.6325 0.7556 0.1169 0.1235 0.4695
λκ2 −0.8868 −1.0872 0 0 0
µ 1.0320 1.0320 1.0320 1.0320 0.2
Figure 4: Forecast-based domestic inflation targeting rule (FB-DITR) and indeterminacy for
three economies. Non-shaded region refers to stable REE cases.
Figure 5: CPI inflation targeting rule (CPITR) and indeterminacy for three economies. Non-
shaded region refers to stable REE cases.
Figure 6: Forecast-based CPI inflation targeting rule (FB-CPITR) and indeterminacy for three
economies. Non-shaded region refers to stable REE cases.
